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Introduction
Model checking [1] is a well-known formal approach for verifying systems that are modeled as state machines. For realistic systems, however, the number of states of the system model can be very large, making the model checking problem intractable. This problem is called the state explosion problem.
Bounded model checking [2] , [3] is one of the successful solutions to this problem. The main idea of bounded model checking is to look for counterexamples that are shorter than some fixed length k for a given property. This limitation allows one to reduce the model checking problem to the satisfiability (SAT) checking problem for a formula of some logic such that its satisfiability implies the existence of a counterexample. Thus if the formula turns out to be satisfiable, then it is possible to conclude that the violation of the property occurs in the system.
Although effective in detecting property violation, bounded model checking cannot be directly used for prov- ing the absence of violation. To cope with this disadvantage, McMillan proposed unbounded model checking [4] , which combines bounded model checking and interpolation.
The key observation used in his method is that when bounded model checking fails to find a counterexample, in which case the formula is unsatisfiable, an overapproximation of the state set reachable in one step can be derived from the unsatisfiability proof produced by the SAT solver. Technically this over-approximation is obtained in the form of an interpolant of the tested formula, using the interpolation procedure. By repeatedly executing the interpolant procedure, an over-approximation of the reachable state set can be obtained. If this over-approximation contains no state violating a given property, then it is ensured that the system meets that property.
However, the application of unbounded model checking to asynchronous software systems has rarely been practiced. Indeed we are not aware of any application to telecommunication systems. This can be explained by the fact that with the conventional encoding, the behavior of an asynchronous system can only be represented as a large formula, thus resulting in large computational cost.
To overcome this problem, in this paper, we propose an interpolation-based unbounded model checking method that can be used for the verification of feature interactions in telecommunication services. In our method, we use a new scheme for encoding the behavior of the system. By exploiting the concurrency of the telecommunication system, this encoding scheme allows a very concise representation of system's behavior. By adapting unbounded model checking to this encoding, we obtain our model checking method. The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated through experiments.
Feature interaction also occurs in more complex systems, such as building control systems and home network systems where the state explosion problem becomes more serious. The techniques for treating feature interaction problem in these systems have been developed based on those for treating feature interactions in telecommunication systems. Hence, this paper shows the applicability of unbounded model checking to such more complex systems.
Previous attempts to improve the performance of unbounded model checking include, for example, [5] - [7] . In [5] , the method of reusing interpolants is proposed to efficiently obtain an over-approximation of the reachable state set. In [6] , hybridization of interpolation and abstraction refinement is studied. In [7] , a new interpolation algorithm Copyright c 2009 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers which is based on linear programming is proposed. These studies aim to improve the interpolation procedure but do not focus on the representation of the behavior of the system. The central idea behind our encoding can also be seen in our earlier work [8] , [9] . In [9] a similar encoding is proposed in the context of the verification of safe Petri nets. The encoding proposed in [8] is used to represent telecommunication systems, as is done in this paper. However transition ordering, which will be explained in Sect. 3.2.1 is not applied in the encoding of [8] . More importantly, in contrast to this paper where unbounded model checking is discussed, these early attempts only deal with bounded model checking.
Telecommunication Services

Examples of Services
In this paper we consider seven telecommunication services taken from ITU-U recommendation [10] and Bellcore's feature standard [11] . 
Call Waiting (CW):
Feature Interaction
Two types of feature interaction are considered. The freedom from these types of interaction can be viewed as safety properties. In order to detect these types of interactions, it suffices to check the reachability the initial state to undesirable states where feature interaction occurs.
Invariant Violation
It is usually the case that services require some specific properties to be satisfied at any time. For example, the OCS service requires that if x specifies y in the screening list, then x is never calling y at any time. Such a property is generally referred to as an invariant. However, combining multiple services can result in violation of this property. Consider a situation where user A has subscribed to OCS service and specified user B in the screening list while user C has activated CF service to B. In this situation, if A calls C, the call is forwarded to B by the CF service. As a result, the invariant property of OCS is violated.
Nondeterminism
Nondeterminism is one of the best known types of feature interactions [12] , [13] . 
System Model
We use State Transition Rules (STR) [14] to describe services and to model the behavior of the system. A service is defined as a 6-tuple U, V, P, E, R, s init , where U is a finite set of service users, V is a finite set of variables, P is a set of predicates, E is a finite set of events, R is a finite set of rules, and s init is the initial state. A predicate p ∈ P is of the form p(x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) where x i ∈ V. An event e ∈ E is of the form e(x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) where x i ∈ V. A rule r ∈ R is of the form:
The pre-condition is a set of predicates or negations of predicates, or both, while the post-condition is a set of predicates. Figure 1 shows an example of a service specification expressed in STR. This specification describes the Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). Additional communication features can be described by modifying this specification (for example, by adding new rules).
A predicate (or an event or a rule) is instantiated by substituting a user a ∈ U for each variable x ∈ V occurring in the predicate (event or rule, respectively) such that no two variables are substituted by the same user. That is, given a predicate p(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , ) ∈ P and a substitution θ = x 1 |a 1 , x 2 |a 2 , . . . , ∀i, j, i j : a i a j , we have a predicate instance p(a 1 , a 2 , . . . ). An event instance or a rule instance is defined similarly. We let P = {p 1 , . . . , p m } denote the set of all predicate instances and m denote the number of the predicate instances (i.e. m = |P|). Also we denote by R = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n } the set of all rule instances and by n the number of the rule instances (i.e. n = |R|).
A state is defined as a set of predicate instances and is In general a state transition system is represented as (S , T, I) where S is the set of states, T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation, and I ⊆ S is the set of initial states. Now, for each rule instance t, let T t ⊆ S × S be the relation over states such that (s, s ) ∈ T t iff t is enabled in s for some event instance and its execution causes a state transition to s . The state transition system (S , T, I) defined by an STR specification S S = U, V, P, E, R, s init is such that T = t∈R T t and I = {s init }. We denote by s t → s iff (s, s ) ∈ T t .
Proposed Method
Symbolic Representation
We propose a propositional SAT-based unbounded model checking method. In order to use propositional SAT solvers for model checking, it is essential to encode the state space and the transition relation with Boolean variables.
Recall that P = {p 1 , . . . , p m } is the set of predicate instances. A state can be represented as a Boolean m-vector such that it has a true in the ith position iff p i holds in that state. In the following of the paper, we represent states with m Boolean variables s = (b 1 , . . . , b m ); that is, a state is a truth assignment of these m variables.
Any set S 0 ⊆ S of states can be represented as a Boolean function f : {true, false} m → {true, false} such that:
For example, the state set where the pre-condition of a rule instance t holds is represented as:
The relation over states is also represented as a Boolean function with 2m Boolean variables, since the relation is simply a set of state pairs. We therefore identify a set of states or of transitions with its corresponding Boolean function. For example, T t is represented as:
where
Example 2: For simplicity, we use the name of a predicate instance to denote its corresponding Boolean variable. Let t be the instance of the rule pots1 in Fig. 1 with substitution θ = x|A . Then we have
The transition relation T is represented as:
For simplicity, assume that we know that T is a total relation [1] . Then whether state set G is reachable from the initial state in k steps can be determined by checking the satisfiability of the following formula:
This is the basic formula used in SAT-based model checking.
Boolean Encoding of Telecommunication Systems
The obstacle to applying SAT-based model checking to asynchronous systems like telecommunication systems is that the transition relation T for such a system can only be represented as a large formula. This can be understood by seeing Example 2: To represent the transitions for each rule instance t, T t must contain conjuncts (b i ↔ b i ) for all Boolean variables b i that represent predicate instances not engaged in that rule. The behavior of a telecommunication system is represented as many rule instance. The execution of each rule instance only changes the value of a small number of predicate instance. Hence, the transition relation T consists largely of formulas that represent the value of predicate instance does not change.
Our encoding overcomes this disadvantage. The intuitive idea is as follows: We introduce a new semantics for system execution that maintains safety properties of the original model. In this semantics the n rule instances are totally ordered and a step is represented as a sequence of n "micro" steps. The ith micro step is either the state transition by the ith rule instance or a stuttering step. Because only two state transitions are possible at each micro step, this semantics can avoid a blow-up in the formula size, which is inherent to symbolic representation of asynchronous systems.
Let Chng[t] denote the set of predicate instances that change their truth value as a result of the execution of rule instance t; that is,
). Our encoding can avoid generating a large subformula related to P\Chng [t] . Now let d t (s, s ) be defined as follows:
Example 3: Let t be the rule instance of pots1 in Fig. 1 with substitution 
By definition d t (s, s ) = true iff s t → s or s = s . Using this property, a step (or more) can be represented by a conjunction of d t (s, s ) as follows:
This means that if this function evaluates to true, s n is reachable from s 0 in at most n steps (including 0 steps), and that if there is at least one t i such that s
→ s i , and s i = · · · = s n = s . Consequently, the following formula BMC k can be used for the verification.
If BMC k is satisfiable, then some state in G is reachable from the initial state in at most k * n steps. If BMC k is unsatisfiable, then no state in G can be reached from the initial state in k steps.
A major benefit of using this formula is that it can be shortened to a considerable extent and thus in turn the run time of SAT solving can be reduced. The idea is as follows. The effect of this optimization is significant, since for practical telecommunication services, a rule execution affects only a small fraction of the predicate instances. Compared to the conventional formula shown in Sect. 3.1, a reduction of around 60 to 90 percent in the number of literal occurrences has typically been observed in the examples tested in Sect. 4.
Remark 1:
For presentation purpose we explain our model checking method using the original BMC k ; but this optimization is always used in the implementation.
Transition Ordering
In practice, the state transitions represented by D critically depend on the order of rule instances. This can be intuitively explained as follows: Consider two rule instances t i and t j and suppose that the execution of t i cause the precondition of t j to hold but not vice versa. We propose a heuristic algorithm for transition ordering, by extending the one in [9] , which is proposed in the context of safe Petri nets. The basic idea is to select a rule instance t when each predicate instance in Pre[t] occurs in s init or in the post-condition of an already selected rule instance. Figure 2 shows the algorithm.
The FIFO queue Done is used for storing rule instances that have already been ordered. The set Checked of predicate instances is used to maintain those occurring in the initial state or in the post-condition of rule instances ordered already. The main part of the algorithm calls procedure Check with each predicate instance occurring in the initial state. In the procedure, first p is added to Checked. In case a given service specification is ill-formed, this algorithm may fail to order all rule instances. It is easy to show that in such a case, the rule instances not selected for ordering are always unenabled, and thus they can safely be omitted.
Example 4:
Consider the service specification in Fig. 1 and let θ1 = x|A, y|B and θ2 = x|B, y|A . The algorithm orders a total of 18 rule instances as follows: (t 1 , · · · , t 18 ) = (pots1θ1, pots1θ2, pots2θ1, pots2θ2,  pots3θ1, pots3θ2, pots4θ1, pots4θ2, pots5θ1, pots5θ2,  pots6θ1, pots6θ2, pots7θ1, pots7θ2, pots8θ1, pots8θ2,  pots9θ1, pots9θ2) , where rθ denotes the instance of a rule r with a substitution θ. With this ordering, BMC 1 allows reachability checking for 12 states, including state {path(A, B), path(B, A)} which requires t 1 = pots1θ1, t 5 = pots3θ1, and t 11 = pots6θ1 to occur in this order to be reached. On the other hand, if the rule instances were reversely ordered, the efficiency would be much deteriorated. In this case BMC 1 can check the reachability of only four states: {idle(A), idle(B)}, {dialtone(A), idle(B)}, {idle(A), dialtone(B)}, and {dialtone(A), dialtone(B)}.
Unbounded Model Checking
State Exploration Using Interpolants
For two first-order logic formulas A and B, if A ∧ B is unsatisfiable, then the interpolant P for A and B is a formula with the following properties:
• A → P, • P ∧ B is unsatisfiable, and • P refers only to the common variables of A and B.
Several interpolation methods have been proposed, including [4] , [7] , [15] . Using an interpolation method with a SAT solver, one can simultaneously perform satisfiability checking and, if the formula is unsatisfiable, interpolant generation.
We divide BMC k into PREF and SUFF k as follows:
If PREF ∧ SUFF k is satisfiable, then the system can reach a state in G. On the other hand, if PREF ∧ SUFF k is unsatisfiable, then an interpolant of PREF and SUFF k can be generated.
The interpolant refers only to the common variables of PREF and SUFF k . Hence, it is a formula over state s n . We denote by Interpolant(s n ) this interpolant and by Interpolant(s n ) s n |s the formula obtained from Interpolant(s n ) by replacing Boolean variables for s n with those for s.
Since the interpolant is implied by PREF, it follows that the Interpolant(s n ) s n |s is true in the initial state and in every state reachable from the initial state in one step. In other words, Interpolant(s n ) s n |s is an over-approximation of the state set reachable from the initial state within one step.
In effect this interpolant usually contains more reachable states than those reachable in one step, because D can represent, in addition to all single steps, up to n consecutive steps. This property contributes to effective state exploration of our method.
Overview of the Algorithm
The overview of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 . The input of the algorithm is a service specification S S = U, V, P, E, R, s init and the state set G whose reachability is to be verified. First, we build the symbolic representations of the transition system M = I, D, G from the given service specification S S = U, V, P, E, R, s init .
The function FiniteRun is at the heart of the algorithm. It has two arguments M and k. The function returns true if it determines, by performing SAT solving for BMC k , that a state in G is reachable and returns false if it determines that no state in G is reachable. In these cases, the algorithm can terminate simply by returning Reachable or Unreachable, according to the result of FinteRun. FinteRun aborts if it is impossible to determine whether or not G is reachable by using given k. In this case, the algorithm increases k and calls FiniteRun again.
The Function FiniteRun
The function FiniteRun is shown in Fig. 4 . The basic design of this function follows that of [4] but is adapted to subtle but important differences in the encoding of system behaviors, elaborated in Sect. 3.2.
In this function, D is used instead of T which is used in [4] In the function R is used to represent the set of explored states. Initially R only represents the initial state. In each iteration of the while loop, R is updated to the interpolant for PREF and SUFF k (line 19) and PREF is updated with I being replaced with R (line 5). At the end of the ith execution of the while loop, R represents an over-approximation of a set of states that are reachable within i steps.
As discussed in the appendix in detail, the iteration of the while loop eventually terminates (or aborts) in either of two ways. The first case is where PREF ∧ SUFF k turns out to be satisfiable. Then the function aborts (line 11), since the satisfiability of PREF ∧ SUFF k only means the reachability of G from R which may contain unreachable states.
The second case is where R reaches a fixed point -the point from which R will never grow further. At this point R contains all reachable states and thus the unreachability of G is immediately concluded from the unsatisfiability of PREF ∧ SUFF k . If this happens, the function terminates by returning false (line 17).
Experiment Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we conducted experiments. We verified 21 pairs of telecommunication services described in Sect. 2.1 using the proposed unbounded model checking method, McMillan's unbounded model checking method [4] and the model checker SPIN [16] . We implemented these two unbounded model checking methods using McMillan's FOCI tool for both SAT solving and interpolant generation. In the proposed unbounded model checking method, the new proposed encoding and the proposed algorithm are used. On the other hand, McMillan's method uses conventional encoding with T and interpolation procedure proposed in [4] .
SPIN, a very well-known model checker, uses explicit state representation, in the sense that it does not employ Boolean state space encoding. We construct Promela models for telecommunication services as follows. We represent each predicate instance by a Boolean variable. We use a single Promela process to represent the behavior of the whole system. The Promela process has, in turn, a single big do statement, in which every rule instance is represented as a guarded command. At any point of time, a single guarded command whose guard is true is nondeterministically selected for execution.
The experiments were performed on a Linux (kernel 2.4) PC with a 2.8 GHz CPU and about 3 Gbyte memory.
We consider invariant properties for four of the seven services as follows: Consequently a total of 18 pairs that contain at least one of the four services are verified against these invariant properties. Because of the symmetry of users, we check the violation with a single variable substitution by users. For example, the invariant of OCS is verified by checking reachability to G
(s) = ¬(¬OCS(A, B) ∨ ¬calling(A, B)), where OCS(A, B) and calling(A, B) are Boolean variables representing predicate instances OCS(A, B) and calling(A, B).
Nondeterminism occurs in states where two rules simultaneously become enabled for the same event. Due to user symmetry, it suffices to check all event instances obtained from any single variable substitution θ 0 of users. Thus we let:
Here eθ 0 is an event instance obtained by the substitution θ 0 and t 1 and t 2 are two different rule instances that have the same event instance eθ 0 . For example, consider the specification shown in Fig. 1 and let θ 0 = x|A, y|B . dial(A, B) , are shared by more than one rule instance. Specifically, onhook(A) triggers pots2θ 0 , pots5θ 0 , pots7θ 0 and pots8θ 0 , offhook(A) triggers pots1θ 0 and pots6θ 0 , and dial(A, B) triggers pots3θ 0 and pots4θ 0 . Hence we have
Three event instances, namely, onhook(A), offhook(A) and
∧ E pots4θ 0 (s) . Table 1 shows the results of the verification of the violation of invariant properties, while Table 2 shows the results of the verification of nondeterminism. The two leftmost columns represent the combination of services tested and whether feature interaction occurs in that combination.
For all the three methods, the execution time needed for verification is presented. The execution time is the total time that elapsed between when a service specification was input and when the verification was completed. NA means that we could not complete verification since an error was caused by memory overflow when the program was generating an interpolant. (The number inside the parentheses shows the elapsed time till the error occurred.)
For the proposed method and McMillan's method, (k, r) shows the value of k of the finally executed instance of FiniteRun and the number of times of computing an interpolant in that execution of FiniteRun.
For all cases where the verification was completed, our proposed method outperformed the McMillan's ordinary unbounded model checking in execution time. In particular, when a violation required a relatively large number of transitions to occur, the proposed method could conclude the existence of the violation using a much smaller value k (labeled [A] in Table 1 and Table 2 ).
For example, when CW and DT are activated at the same time, a feature interaction occurs after ten steps from the initial state. As can be seen in Table 1 , the interaction was detected with k = 10 using the conventional encoding (McMillan's method). On the other hand, our approach can detect the interaction with k = 2. This is because that D represents not only one transition but also at most n consecutive transitions. This means that using our encoding scheme the state space can be explored with a lower value of k than the value required by McMillan's method.
This fact can be seen for the cases labeled [B] in Table 1 and Table 2 . In these cases, our proposed method can explore all reachable states. On the other hand, McMillan's method can not explore the reachable states even with a greater value of k than the value required for our proposed method. For example, for the case DC + DO in Table 1 , the over-approximation of the reachable states can be obtained by our proposed method with k = 3 and three times of computation of an interpolant. McMillan's method can not obtain the reachable states with k = 8 and five times of computation of an interpolant.
In some cases labeled [C] in Table 2 , the same (k, r) is required, but our method outperformed McMillan's method in execution time. This is cased by the fact that our proposed encoding scheme can generate concise formulas to represent system's behavior. For example, in case OCS + TCS in Table 2 , the system has 39 predicate instances and 78 rule instances. T consists of about 6,000 literals, and a formula to be checked in McMillan's method has about 12,000 literals. On the other hand, D consists of about 600 literals, and a formula to be checked in the proposed method has about 1,200 literals. The difference of these two formulas results in the difference of the execution time.
SPIN consistently exhibited good performance; but our proposed method outperformed SPIN for many cases labeled [D] in Table 1 and in Table 2 . When our method showed lower performance or even aborted, a large k was (or would be) needed for the algorithm to terminate. This is explained by the fact the time needed for checking the satisfiability of the formula and generating an interpolant rapidly increases with the size of the input formula.
One might think that the result is somewhat discouraging; but we think there is still plenty of room for improving our method. In our method we use FOCI. FOCI is tool for checking the satisfiability of formulas and generating interpolant using a result of satisfiability checking. However there are faster SAT solver, such as MiniSat [17] . By developing a new tool for computing interpolants using such a faster SAT solver, we may be able to enhance the performance of our method.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a verification method for checking whether or not feature interaction occurs in telecommunication services. We used a new encoding scheme that effectively represents the behaviors of asynchronous systems such as telecommunication systems. Based on this encoding, we developed an unbounded model checking method.
To show the effectiveness of our method, we conducted experiments. To the best of our knowledge this was the first time to adapt unbounded model checking to the interleaving concurrency of asynchronous systems. The results of the experiments showed that our proposed method can verify the services much more quickly than the conventional unbounded model checking. Comparing to the SPIN model checker, our method often exhibited better or comparable performance; but in some cases ours could not complete verification, while SPIN solved the verification problem in a few seconds.
There is plenty of room for improving the proposed method. Our implementation is still in its prototype stage. This is in contrast to SPIN, which has been consistently im-proved for around two decades. Our current implementation uses FOCI for interpolant generation. FOCI supports not only pure propositional logic but also uninterpreted functions or linear arithmetic. By developing a new, faster interpolation procedure tailored to propositional logic, we may be able to enhance the performance of our method. This expectation can also be justified by the facts that the research on interpolation is still in its early stage, and that the performance of SAT solving has been improved by several orders of magnitude in this decade.
be satisfiable since G can be reached within k G = k − 1 steps from that state. Since the number of states of the system is finite, R eventually reaches a fixed point, at which time the function returns false and terminates. 
